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Abstract 
 
This paper uses a political opportunity approach for studying the relationship of minority 
groups to the political community in Britain. The argument is made that the British Race 
Relations approach established in the 1960s, has had an important effect which still shapes the 
patterns of political mobilisation and contention by different minority groups today. Original 
data on political claims-making by minorities demonstrates that British ‘racialised’ cultural 
pluralism has structured an inequality of opportunities facing the two main groups, African 
Caribbeans and Indian Subcontinent minorities. African-Caribbeans mobilise along racial 
lines, use a strongly assimilative ‘black’ identity, conventional action forms, and target state 
institutions with demands for justice that are framed within the recognised framework of Race 
Relations. Conversely, a high proportion of the Indian Subcontinent minority mobilisation is 
by Muslim groups, a non-assimilative religious identity. These are autonomously organised, 
but largely make public demands for extending the principle of racial equality to their non-
racial group. Within the Indian Subcontinent minorities, the relative absence of mobilisation 
by Indian, Sikh and Hindu minorities, who have achieved much better levels of socio-
economic success than Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims, suggests that there is also a strong 
socio-economic basis for shared experiences and grievances as Muslims in Britain. This 
considerably relativises the notion that Muslim mobilisation is Britain is purely an expression 
of the right for cultural difference per se, and sees it as a product of the paradoxes of British 
Race Relations.     
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Political Mobilisation by Minorities in Britain1: 
outcomes, side-effects and negative feedbacks of ‘Race Relations’? 
 
Introduction 
 
In the 1990s, minority mobilisation has regularly hit the British news headlines. Asylum-
seekers riot against the conditions in detention centres, Muslims legally challenge a company 
director’s refusal to employ them, African Caribbean minorities campaign against police 
racism and discrimination in the criminal justice system. In a country where élite thinking 
prides itself in the perceived successes of its Race Relations approach, which politicians 
compare favourably to experiences in mainland Europe, the persistence of minority 
mobilisation casts considerable doubt on this image of integration and harmony. 
 
The image presented of minority mobilisation by media thematisation, and also to some 
extent by academic research, tends to be informed by reference to a few paradigmatic 
examples that become a cause célèbre. The Rushdie Affair and the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry 
have been much discussed in the media and academic literature, but we have less information 
on how representative these events really are of the conflict lines between minorities, majority 
and the state. Clearly, at the surface of public culture such key events symbolise a ‘rite of 
passage’ in British Race Relations. However, it is also important to build an understanding of 
the general patterns of interaction and social relationships between minorities and the 
majority, and the state, so that it is possible to trace these conflicts to contradictions within the 
British policy approach. 
 
Political élite debates and their shaping of British Race Relations -policies, outcomes and 
implementation-, and the majority public concerns, have been relatively well documented 
(e.g., Solomos 1993). In addition, recent survey work makes an important contribution to 
finding out how different minority groups see themselves within British society (Modood et. 
al. 1997). Although an important concern in the ‘classical’ sociological approaches to ethnic 
relations, typified by the work of Rex (e.g., 1991, 1996), there have been few recent 
systematic attempts to study the autonomous collective mobilisation by minorities, which is 
an important indicator for how minorities act in relation to the political environment which 
confronts them. Much of the contemporary literature focuses rather one-sidedly on minority 
political activism from the perspective of party political interest representation of minority 
voters (e.g., Sewell 1993, Goulborne 1998, Geddes 1998a, Saggar 1998). Although an 
important indicator for political participation, this approach perhaps ends up explaining more 
about the parties than the minorities themselves. On the other side, many accounts which have 
actually focused directly on autonomous collective mobilisation in the British context, have 
been more intent on advocating some idiosyncratic normative version of ‘black politics’ than 
giving detailed and accurate information about the subject matter (e.g., Shukra 1998). 
 
Political contention and collective mobilisation have long been a concern of social 
movements scholars (see Tarrow 1998). Applying a similar approach here, our topic of 
inquiry is to examine the visible lines of political conflict over the relationship of minorities to 
the political community, which are constructed by the collective action of state actors, the 
ethnic majority and minorities. The first aim is straightforward and descriptive, to give a first 
‘bird’s eye’ overview of the patterns, identities, organisations, aims, forms and targets of 
minority mobilisation in 1990s Britain. Secondly, following the recent important international 
studies on citizenship, and the institutional channelling of political action by minorities (e.g., 
Ireland 1994), it is clear that patterns of minority mobilisation can tell us much about the 
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system of incorporation. Applying a ‘political opportunity’ perspective -developed in an 
internationally comparative research project, Mobilization on Ethnic Relations Citizenship 
and Immigration (MERCI)2- the different levels and types of mobilisation by different groups 
will be interpreted as an indicator for the ‘outcomes, side-effects and negative feedbacks’ that 
are produced by the British Race Relations approach. It is to this theoretical perspective on 
political opportunities, drawn from social movement research, that we now briefly turn. 
 
Political Opportunities for Minority Mobilization 
 
In the recent international comparative literature on citizenship, migration and ethnic 
relations, many authors have pointed to the ways that national policies and laws governing 
citizenship and naturalisation can impact upon the integration of minorities and shape the 
patterns of migration and ethnic relations politics (e.g., Brubaker 1992, Castles 1995). Some 
such as Patrick Ireland (1994), have described these institutional frameworks as a ‘political 
opportunity structure’, where variables of citizenship laws, naturalisation procedures, and 
social and political rights, including social welfare, are seen to causally shape the patterns of 
the collective organisation by minorities and migrants. Others such as Adrian Favell (1998), 
have pointed out that such institutional variables have a public discursive dimension - as 
‘public philosophies of integration’ - which are embedded in a nationally specific set of 
language and symbols, and through which they achieve legitimacy. In general, however, one 
might claim that the application of opportunity approaches in the migration field is still in its 
infancy. 
 
Social movements scholars (e.g., Tarrow 1989, 1998, Kriesi et al. 1995) have long used the 
concept of ‘political opportunities’ for studying protest and collective mobilization, and it is 
also well established that political opportunities have both institutional and discursive 
dimensions (see the contributions to McAdam, McCarthy and Zald eds. 1996). In the 
international comparative project MERCI, a systematic attempt is made to apply a political 
opportunity approach for comparing ‘claims-making’ by collective actors in the field of 
migration and ethnic relations politics. By claims-making we refer not only to conventional 
forms of protest and collective mobilisation that have been the focus of many social 
movement studies, but also to speech acts and more conventional action forms, which make 
demands visible in the public domain. For international comparison, the different national 
institutional forms and discourses about ‘citizenship’ have been identified as a key variable 
for defining the structure of political opportunities which confronts claims-makers. It should 
be made explicit here that when we refer to ‘citizenship’, we are not just referring to the 
‘narrow’ meaning of citizenship in formal legal statutes, but to citizenship as a field where 
political and social rights, and cultural obligations, are contested by collective action. Authors 
such as Tilly (1997:600) define citizenship in such terms, where access to citizenship is seen 
as a basis for political claims-making,  
 
‘Citizenship designates a set of mutually enforceable claims relating categories of persons to 
agents of governments... It differs from most other contracts in 1) binding whole categories of 
persons rather than single individuals to each other, 2) involving differentiation among levels 
and degrees of members, 3) directly engaging a government’s coercive power. To the extent 
that governments control substantial resources, including coercive means, these three 
differentials single out citizenship as a potent form of contract liable to fierce contestation.’ 
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Following the findings of the citizenship debates cited above, the determinants for the degree 
and form of inclusiveness/exclusiveness of a national politics for incorporating minorities can 
be defined along two broad dimensions of citizenship: first, the criteria for formal access to 
citizenship, and secondly, the cultural obligations that this access to citizenship entails. The 
approach and findings of this comparative research has been published elsewhere (Koopmans 
and Statham 1998, 1999a, 1999b), and will not be elaborated further here. However, these two 
dimensions of citizenship can also be applied to the national level, as a basis for hypotheses 
on the claims-making by different types of minority groups (see also Rosenhek in this 
volume). 
 
When applied to comparing different minorities internally within a nation, the first important 
dimension of political opportunities relates to status of citizenship rights of the minority 
group. Clearly, minorities with full national citizenship rights will have greater opportunities 
for access to institutional politics - e.g., through voting, party representation of interests - and 
social welfare rights, and be conferred a greater legitimacy in the public domain, than either 
foreign migrants, ‘illegal immigrants’ or asylum-seekers. The second dimension of political 
opportunities facing minorities, relates to the cultural obligations which the state places on 
defining access to citizenship. These requirements depend on the specifics of a state’s 
incorporation strategy, and may range from assimilationist to cultural pluralist approaches, 
which differ in the degree of cultural homogeneity a state demands in attributing full rights to 
minorities. There are different ways in which the position of a minority is defined in relation 
to the state and majority population. Assimilationism is the more demanding variant, 
requiring the minority to undergo full conversion to the dominant national culture as the 
single and unitary focus of identity and belonging within the national political community. In 
contrast, cultural pluralism is the more accepting variant, where the state recognises the right 
of the minority to retain a degree of ethnic or religious difference as part of the deal for being 
fully included within the national political community. Of course, much is dependent on the 
specific categorisation of cultural diversity which a state chooses to recognise as legitimate 
within its strategy for incorporating minorities within the framework of the national 
community.  
 
Translating this into opportunities, one would expect as a general hypothesis that those 
minorities which are recognised by the state’s criteria for attributing cultural pluralism - either 
on the basis of race, religion, or ethnicity - find it easier to constitute themselves as 
independent collective actors, and to assert claims for a further extension of minority rights. 
Alternatively, minorities faced by assimilationist pressures, can be generally expected to 
mobilise across cultural boundaries -of religion, race or ethnicity- and to make demands as a 
common status group -e.g., as immigrants or along class lines- within the national political 
community. Of course, as we shall see, much depends on how a national variant of cultural 
pluralism/assimilationism actually translates into opportunities within a contingent political 
context, in some cases minorities facing assimilationist pressures may react against these by 
mobilising along religious, racial or ethnic lines. This points to the need for empirical research 
on how minorities actually mobilise in relation to national politics.  
 
More extensive details on how this model is applied to the British case are given in the 
empirical analysis. Before moving on to the analysis of minority claims-making in Britain, we 
first give summary details on the method that was used for retrieving the data from newspaper 
sources. 
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Reconstructing Claims-Making from Newspaper Reports: a note on method3 
  
The research strategy attempts to combine the quantitative rigour of recording collective 
actions with a qualitative sensitivity for the discursive elements of the claims that are made by 
actors. For the national study, the core data source has been retrieved from one national 
newspaper, The Guardian, which is a broadsheet newspaper with a reputation for a consistent 
and detailed coverage of the topic. Reports relating to the topic were collected from the ‘hard 
news’ sections of the newspaper reporting national daily events, omitting editorial and 
commentary sections, for three editions (Monday, Wednesday and Friday) of the six which 
appear each week. This meant using the newspaper materials as a record of significant public 
events, and bracketing out the journalistic opinion and commentary on the reported news 
events. It should be made absolutely clear at this point, that this method has also been applied 
to other newspapers in order to control for biases in the primary newspaper source.4 
 
For coding, the primary unit of analysis for ‘claims-making’ is the reported act. This follows 
in the methodological tradition of protest event analysis from social movement research 
(Rucht, Koopmans and Neidhardt eds. 1998), and not that of many media contents analyses 
which take the article as the unit of analysis. The coded acts for claims-making may either be 
a protest event (demonstration, riot, arson, etc.) or a conventional action form (public 
statement, press conference, policy decision, etc.). It needs emphasising that the opinions and 
claims made by the author of the news article are not coded, we are interested only in the acts 
and claims that are attributed to ‘third parties’. All acts within the ethnic, racist/extreme right, 
and anti-racist mobilisation fields are coded, plus all acts by all actors in the issue fields of 
asylum/immigration, ethnic relations, anti-racism/xenophobia that occur on the national 
territory. Important variables refer to actor types; action forms; the size, target and intensity of 
protest mobilisation (where present); and the institutional or civil society actor on whom 
demands are made (addressee). Regarding the semantic contents of the claims, these are 
coded for the political aims and/or causal frames (where present). The different claims made 
by one actor in relation to a specific act are coded as part of the unitary act, with the most 
important being coded as the principal aim.5 As well as using a highly detailed category 
system, an attempt is made to store the discursive contents of claims, where this is feasible 
and necessary by retrieving the original speech of the claim which is present in the original 
text. 
 
The resultant database has a high level of flexibility. It is suitable for macro-level analyses of 
general issue-fields for cross-national research, but at the same time it can give detailed 
information on a particular actor and its strategic location within the national issue-field, 
which will be the main object of investigation here.6 
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Minority Claims-making in Britain 
 
The literature on social movements indicates that the impact of political opportunities on 
levels of mobilisation is curvilinear. When facing highly favourable or highly unfavourable 
political opportunities, mobilisation levels are likely to be low, in the first case, mobilisation 
is not necessary and demands are taken up quickly by a responsive political system, and in the 
second, it is too difficult and there are few chances of success (see e.g., Tarrow 1998, Kriesi 
et al. 1995). In Britain, although significant steps have been taken through race relations and 
anti-discrimination policies to combat the inequality and discrimination faced by minorities, 
the political opportunities facing minorities are not sufficiently favourable to make 
mobilisation superfluous, not least because the state has itself been identified as a key source 
of disadvantage and discrimination in society. Of course, not all minorities are in a position to 
mobilise political demands in the public domain. For example, they may lack the material and 
organisational resources for entering the political field as an autonomous collective actor and 
making their demands visible. Alternatively, they may lack the symbolic resources of a 
legitimate and officially recognised ‘status’, which is likely to make their claims appear more 
justified and reasonable by other actors in the political field.  
 
In the first part of the analysis, we give a brief overview and inquire into the formal 
dimension of citizenship, by comparing non-citizens to resident minorities. Table one shows 
the share of claims-making by different actors in migration and ethnic relations politics. The 
overall field is divided into three main political sub-fields: immigration and asylum; minority; 
and anti-racism/xenophobia. Immigration and asylum covers issues dealing with minorities 
without full formal citizenship – ‘aliens’, whereas minority politics and anti-
racism/xenophobia are issue-fields concerning resident minorities. Minority politics covers 
issues in the policy field relating to the integration of minorities (discrimination and cultural 
diversity), whereas anti-racist/xenophobic politics is that relating to the relationship between 
majority and minority population in the public domain (mutual tolerance). In addition, all 
claims-making acts were coded for their ideological ‘valence’: with –1 for anti-
minority/racist; +1 for pro-minority/anti-racist; and 0 for neutral/ambivalent. This gives a 
‘valence’ score ranging from –1 which is anti-minority/racist, to +1 which is pro-
minority/anti-racist. 
 
-Table 1 here- 
 
An first important finding concerns the high share of minorities in claims-making who 
account for about a fifth (19.4%) in the overall field. This shows that British migration and 
ethnic relations politics is not just about minorities, but that it is a political field which is 
importantly shaped by their actions and demands.7 However, our data also shows that 
minorities have a three times greater share in claims-making in the field of minority politics 
(29.8%), and almost twice as much in the anti-racism/xenophobia field (16.8%) than they do 
in immigration politics (9.8%). Many commentators have outlined the sharp division between 
British migration and ethnic relations politics into two separate policy fields, immigration and 
race relations, with differential consequences in the treatment of minorities (e.g., Layton-
Henry 1994). This finding demonstrates a general point, that minorities with access to formal 
citizenship, are able to draw on their resources of legitimacy and access to politics, embedded 
in Race Relations, and have a greater share in the politics about them, than minorities without 
such rights. By contrast, minorities making demands in the immigration/asylum field face a 
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more hostile field (0.32 valence compared to 0.51 for minority and 0.41 for anti-
racism/xenophobia), and depend more heavily on the altruism of human rights, welfare and 
pro-minority organisations (15.5%), such as the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants. 
 
Turning briefly to political parties, which constitute an important source of access for 
minorities to political participation, we find a similar pattern. Table 2 shows the distribution 
and valence of claims-making by actors with political party identities. Not surprisingly, the 
overall valences (-0.16 for immigration/asylum, 0.2 for minority and antiracism/xenophobia) 
show once more that it is harder to take up a political position against issues concerning 
British minorities than asylum seekers and refugees. What is also interesting, however, is that 
there is a clear left-right party political cleavage over migration and ethnic relations, 
principally between the Labour Party (0.8 on immigration/asylum, 0.65 on minority and 
antiracism/xenophobia) and the Conservative Party (-0.5 on immigration/asylum, 0.03 on 
minority and antiracism/xenophobia). This finding strongly supports the body of research 
which has argued that the Labour Party is an important vehicle for the political advancement 
of minorities (e.g., Geddes 1998b, Sewell 1993). Conversely, the Conservative Party comes 
out with a strongly anti-minority position in immigration and asylum politics, which implies 
that there could be a process of co-optation of the issue from the extreme right BNP who have 
no presence in the field.8   
 
After making these brief and very general points, in the remainder of the analysis, we turn the 
focus of inquiry onto the resident minorities within Britain, most of whom can be assumed to 
have full citizenship status. This shifts our attention to the second dimension of citizenship: 
assimilation/cultural pluralism. 
 
The 1976 Race Relations Act and subsequent legislation recognised the principle of ‘racial 
equality’ for individuals, and introduced measures for redress against discrimination on the 
basis of ‘race, colour or national origins’ and ‘equal opportunities’, especially in the labour 
market. In addition, the Commission for Racial Equality was set up as a national watchdog to 
encourage fair and equal treatment, but with only limited advisory powers. Official forms of 
categorisation for minority groups are important symbolic markers which define the type of 
assimilationism/cultural pluralism which is required by a state for including a minority group 
in the political community. The British ‘racial’ form is a hybrid between the extremes of 
assimilationism and cultural pluralism. It recognises one form of cultural diversity -race- as 
the basis for requiring redress to the discrimination, which prevents full access to social and 
political equality for minorities. However, this official state sponsorship for ‘racial equality’ 
represents only a minimalist cultural pluralism, where other types of cultural diversity, such as 
religious identification, are relegated to the status of individual private concerns.9   
 
From a political opportunity perspective, the degree and type of assimilationism/cultural 
pluralism -sponsored by a national politics, and variable across time- leads us to different 
expectations in the claims-making of minorities. In the British Race Relations case, one would 
primarily expect to find mobilisation by groups along racial lines, where minorities make their 
political demands as a group which can be recognised and legitimated by the official brand of 
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pluralism. On the contrary, minority groups mobilising on the basis of a cultural category 
which is not recognised by British form of pluralism -e.g. a non-recognised religion- face high 
barriers to making themselves visible and recognised as a group with legitimate grievances in 
the political domain. Facing assimilationist pressures, such minority groups are likely to be 
marginalised from access to the political system, and subject to internal pressures of 
fragmentation, unless they can find a way of linking their demands to the official basis of 
categorisation. They could, for example, ‘racialise’ the definition of their religious group, so 
that it may fit better within the state’s interpretative framework of categorisation for gaining 
access to political resources.  
 
By relating the self-definition of a minority group to the categorisation which it is attributed 
by the majority group, and which is embedded in the state’s integration politics, it is possible 
to identify four strategies of minority claims-making:10 
 
assimilative strategy: where the self-categorisation of minority claims-making primarily 
emphasises the majority group dimension of membership to the political community, 
embedded in the state’s integration politics, and relegates the minority group self-identity. 
 
dissociative strategy: where the self-categorisation of minority claims-making is made in 
terms of minority group membership, and not in terms of the majority group labelling, 
embodied in the official categorisation of the state integration politics. 
 
acculturative strategy: where the self-categorisation of minority claims-making is a mixture 
of the dissociative and assimilative dimensions. This is an intermediary position which strikes 
a balance between the majority/state-sponsored categorisation for membership to the political 
community, and autonomous self-identification as a member of a minority group.  
 
marginal strategy: where claims-making reflects neither the majority group/state 
categorisation for minorities, nor self-identification as a minority group. In this case, claims-
making rejects categorisation either as a ‘minority’ or in relation to the dominant authority of 
the host state, for example by defining itself as a transnational community, and its interests 
beyond categorisation within the receiving state.11 
 
Taken as indicators for the relationship of minority claims-making to national ethnic relations 
politics, assimilative are the most integrated strategies, followed by acculturative, dissociative 
and, finally, marginal. In the following, we shall use our data on political contention in British 
migration and ethnic relations, to see which claims-making strategies are used by specific 
minority groups. In particular, we shall focus on the collective identities, action forms, 
institutional addressees, and types of claims, that are made in minority claims-making, to see 
what this tells us about the nature, intensity, and patterns of political conflict, that are 
produced by minority mobilisation in Britain. First, however, it is necessary to have an idea of 
the size and composition of minorities Britain, for which the best source is the 1991 Census, 
although it is worth pointing out that this information is itself a ‘politicised’ categorisation of 
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minorities (Mason 1995), and –as we shall see- may not coincide with how the actors define 
themselves. 
 
-table three here-  
 
The 1991 population figures indicate that minorities account for 5.5 percent of the national 
population, and there are about 900,000 people of African-Caribbean origins, and about 
1,500,000 with origins in the Indian subcontinent. As these two groups comprise about 80 
percent of the minority population in Britain, much of the analysis will focus on a comparison 
of these two large macro-categories of minorities. Reference to other minorities will made to 
draw out specific points. 
 
Minority Collective Identities in Claims-making 
 
The collective identities which minority groups use in their political claims-making are part of 
a process of ‘self’ and ‘other’ categorisation between minorities and majorities. Minority 
identities are constructed by the group as a self-definition of its relationship to the wider 
political community, and other ethnic groups. Hence the collective identity which a group 
uses when entering the public domain, constitutes a strategic dimension of claims-making.12 
For example, minorities of Pakistani background in Britain may mobilise collective claims as 
‘Pakistanis’, ‘Asians’, ‘Muslims’, or as ‘Black’. The actual collective identity which appears 
in the field is a political outcome that gives important information on the nature of the 
relationship between the minority and the state.  
 
Table four shows the collective identities that were expressed by minority claims-making in 
Britain. It distinguishes between four broad types of identities. First, ‘status groups’ are where 
the minorities identify themselves as having a common status that cross-cuts ethnic or cultural 
boundaries. Examples here include claims-making by groups defining themselves as ‘ethnic 
minorities’, or ‘asylum-seekers’. Secondly, minority claims-making may be on the basis of 
‘racial’ labelling or self-identification as ‘Black’ or the generic identity ‘Asian’. Thirdly, 
religious identification may be the important symbolic boundary marker in claims-making, or 
fourthly, it might be common national or ethnic descent.  
 
-table four about here- 
 
According to the political opportunity perspective, minorities may optimise their chances of 
success by organising their claims-making along lines of national origin, ethnicity, religion, or 
common status, depending on which identity is recognised as being legitimate by a country’s 
migration and ethnic relations politics. It is well documented, that in Britain ‘race’ is the state 
sponsored category for cultural difference that has been applied in the attempt to integrate 
minorities within the national community. Integration policies have been framed by the 
concept of ‘racial equality’, which has been backed up by several rounds of legislation since 
the 1976 Race Relations Act, and state sponsored bodies such as the national Commission for 
Racial Equality (CRE), and local race equality councils which operate with a mandate to 
uphold these principles (see e.g., Solomos 1993). For Britain, one would therefore expect to 
find a high proportion of groups using ‘racial’ collective identities for entering the political 
domain. It should also be noted that the racial term ‘Black’ has not only become the 
predominant form of identification for minorities with backgrounds in the West Indies or 
Africa, but it has acquired the notion of a ‘status group’ for representing all minorities in 
general.  
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Looking at the first column of table four, more than a third (36.7%) of minority claims-
making used racial identities, which was higher than either religious or national and ethnic 
forms of identification. Of the minority claims-making using racial identification, virtually all 
occurred with the officially sponsored racial sub-categorisations of ‘Black’, ‘Black and 
Asian’, ‘Asian’ or ‘Black African’, that are similar to those which appear in the national 
population census. Allied to the fact that another 8.4% used the status ‘ethnic minorities’, it 
appears that in general there is a strong tendency toward assimilative strategies of 
identification by minorities (about half of all claims-making) in Britain. 
  
This tendency toward assimilative identification is particularly strong among African-
Caribbean claims-making. Of the African-Caribbeans in Britain, the majority -just under two 
thirds- have origins in the Caribbean. It is therefore striking that there were no recorded cases 
of claims-making on the basis of national or ethnic origin by minorities with Caribbean 
ancestry, such as ‘Jamaicans’ or ‘West Indians’ despite the relatively large number with such 
characteristics. In the case of Africans, the few cases of claims-making by national origin as 
‘Nigerians’ or ‘Zaireans’, were by groups without British nationality, who were seeking 
political asylum, refugee status or resident rights, and did not have access to the 
assimilationist criteria. This indicates that virtually all claims-making by British minority 
groups with Caribbean or African national origins or ancestry takes place under the racial 
label ‘Black’.13 Political mobilisation by African-Caribbeans can therefore be seen to be 
strongly shaped by the racialised basis of British integration policies. 
 
This finding does not hold, however, for Indian Subcontinent minorities. In contrast to 
African-Caribbeans, although Indian Subcontinent claims-making uses the assimilative 
identity ‘Asian’ (9.2%), they were three times more likely to mobilise using dissociative 
identities, of religion (‘Muslim/Islamic’ 23.8%), or national and ethnic origin (8.5%). Taken 
at face value, this finding supports the argument that the centrality of the concept of ‘black’ 
identity to British Race Relations, has produced an approach which is more geared toward 
providing for the political integration of African-Caribbean than Indian subcontinent 
minorities. Several authors have pointed out the difficulty which Indian Subcontinent 
minorities have in identifying themselves as a single collective group under the official 
lumpen categorisation ‘Asian’, or as ‘Black’ (Modood 1988, 1992). This is backed up by 
opinion data where less than a quarter of all Asian groups ever think of themselves as ‘black’ 
– Indian 26%, African Asian 21%, Pakistani 23%, Bangladeshi 18% (Modood et. 
al.1997:295). Our findings show that the ‘racialisation’ of the British integration politics, 
established in the sixties in response to Caribbean migration, then extended for the later wave 
of migrants from the Indian Subcontinent, has produced a differential set of opportunities for 
the political participation of these two sets of minorities, which still has an impact on their 
political mobilisation today. 
 
To add detail to this general point, it is necessary to look more closely at the patterns within 
Indian Subcontinent mobilisation. A striking finding is that almost a quarter of all minority 
claims-making (23.8%) is made by Indian-subcontinent groups with the ‘Muslim’ religious 
identification. Estimates put the total number of Muslims in Britain at between 900,000 and 
1.5 million (Rex 1996, Poulter 1998:197), and a large proportion of practising Muslims are 
from the Indian Subcontinent. In addition, there are between about 400,000 to 550,000 Hindus 
and 300,000 to 500,000 Sikhs with Indian Subcontinent origins in Britain (Poulter 1998: 238; 
282). As about 95 percent of minorities with Pakistani or Bangladeshi origins are Muslims, 
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 There were two exceptions to this, namely, mobilisations under the dissociative religious identity, by the 
Nation of Islam group and by Rastafarians.   
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and in contrast, 90 percent of minorities with Indian origins Hindus or Sikhs (Modood et al 
1997:297), it is plausible to see the high levels of Muslim mobilisation as principally by 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi minorities.  
 
The use of ‘Muslim’ identification in political claims-making is a strongly dissociative 
strategy, because the British state does not recognise the principle of ‘religious equality’ 
within its anti-discrimination policies.14 Acts of discrimination against Muslims in 
employment or housing cannot be prosecuted under the British law. This shows then that 
minorities of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origins, have a strongly dissociative basis to their 
claims-making. Moreover, their self-identification as ‘Muslims’ is more than four times 
higher than the old ‘colonial’ homeland forms of national and ethnic identification. Clearly, 
the Muslim identity has become the important basis for autonomous political mobilisation by 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi minority groups, and importantly it constitutes a form of political 
contention that contradicts the ‘racial’ basis of cultural pluralism within British integration 
politics.  
 
Turning to the minorities of Indian origin, the other component of Indian Subcontinent 
minorities, we find another striking finding. In stark contrast to Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, 
we find virtually no evidence of political claims-making by groups of Indian origin, either by 
religious, national or ethnic identities (1% as ‘Indian’ and 1% as ‘Sikh’, and none as ‘Hindu’), 
although  this group accounts for more than half of the resident Indian Subcontinent 
population in Britain. This points toward a strong division within Indian Subcontinent 
minorities relating to their political integration, and strongly supports the argument made by 
Tariq Modood  that the differences in experiences among this group are better explained by 
the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims, than by country of origin, ‘Asian’ 
background, or colour (1992: 33): 
 
‘(B)y most socio-economic measures there is a major divide between Sunni Muslims on the 
one hand and the other Asians, and that this divide is as great as between Asian and whites, or 
between Asians and blacks.’  
 
Modood takes this further, arguing that not all Indian minorities have achieved socio-
economic success, and that especially Gujeratis of rural origin, who are Muslims, suffer 
similar levels of deprivation as Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. This again re-enforces the 
Muslim categorisation, as the important symbolic boundary marker for a group with a shared 
experience in British society.   
 
The lack of Indian mobilisation, however, is best explained by a combination of factors. 
Firstly, their relative socio-economic success makes recourse to autonomous political action 
relatively unnecessary as means for gaining access to material resources within Britain. 
According to social indicators for economic success, employment levels, and educational 
achievement where they score similar levels to the ethnic majority, Indian minority groups 
have achieved a high degree of integration to British society. This is particularly the case for 
Indians of ‘East African Asian’ origins who in many cases score even better than whites in 
social achievement, but also for Indian minorities in general. For example, unemployment 
rates are three times (2.8) higher for Bangladeshis and two and a half times (2.5) higher for 
                                                           
14
 The British state has its own Anglican Church, and upholds general religious tolerance, though religion itself 
is relegated to the private domain of individual conscience and not seen as a field for state intervention. 
Measures against religious discrimination apply only to Northern Ireland where they are designed to prevent 
sectarian conflict. Jews and Sikhs are recognised as ‘ethnic’ minorities and so have recourse to anti-
discrimination within British law (Rex 1996, Favell 1998, Poulter 1998). 
 12
Pakistanis than for Whites, whereas those for Indians (1.3) are only slightly higher, and those 
for African Asians (0.9) actually lower (Modood 1998:64). Such findings underline those of 
the earlier Labour Force Survey and Census studies (Mason 1995). In addition, the Indian 
groups tended to come from wealthier ‘homeland’ backgrounds with more resources, and 
were better qualified than their Muslim counterparts. Lastly, the divisions within Indian 
Subcontinent minorities along national and religious difference seem to be more important 
lines of identity cleavage than the commonality of being ‘Asian’, which is in fact a 
categorisation that has been imposed by the state. Successful groups from the Indian 
Subcontinent are therefore much more likely to participate in conventional forms of political 
action with the ethnic majority, with whom they have similar social status, than risk the high 
costs of contentious political activism with groups with whom they share a migrant 
background, but strongly differ in religious and national identification. 
 
Considering that they appear to be relatively well socially integrated in Britain, Indian 
mobilisation is more likely to be for non-material group demands, rather than for general 
demands for social inclusion.15 This in fact brings the mobilisation patterns of Indians closer 
to that of other well integrated former migrant communities, such as the Jews and the Irish.   
 
In a sense, the ‘racial’ basis of British cultural pluralism, encourages political quietism from 
the most successful, and political contention from the least successful Indian Subcontinent 
groups, as it does not provide a legitimate symbolic marker for political activism with which 
such minorities can identify themselves.  In addition, the high level of Muslim mobilisation is 
an important finding which illustrates that there are limits to the capacities of a state’s ethnic 
relations politics for shaping the identities of minorities in their own image, and it indicates 
that there is a grain of truth in the emphasis which multicultural theorists place on cultural 
difference and the expression of particularity as the key to minority claims-making (e.g., 
Kymlicka 1995). 
 
The second column in Table four, ‘named organisations’, is a sub-category of the first. It 
includes only those cases of organisations which are actually named in the report. This means 
that the second column gives actual information on minority organisations and excludes 
groups, such as youths in spontaneous protests, that are lacking formal organisation.16  
 
The names which minority organisations give themselves are important indicators how they 
place themselves in relation to British society. In general, the overall patterns in the second 
column confirm the tendencies in the overall sample. However, there are still a couple of 
points worth underlining, from the additional detail which is available.  
 
A first point to make is that although in the overall sample there were more racially defined 
groups (36.7%) than religiously defined groups (24.5%), the reverse is true when looking at 
the organisations of the minority groups (29.1% ‘racial’; 47.9% ‘religious’). This indicates 
that a higher level of autonomous organisation is necessary for groups that are not recognised 
by Race Relations politics, than those that are, if demands are to be successfully mobilised. 
Differentiating between the main categories of religious and racial organisations, reveals more 
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 Of the six cases of Indian and Sikh mobilisation in our sample, only one made material demands within 
Britain for relating to employment, the others related to immigration and asylum, homeland politics, and one was 
a cultural demand for recognition of Indic (sic) languages in schools. 
16
 This distinction is made to relativise the effects of possible distortions that might arise from the collective 
identities we have coded being ascribed by journalists, rather than being the form of self-identification by the 
group itself. 
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about the nature of the mobilising structures used by Indian Subcontinent and African-
Caribbean minorities for making autonomous demands in British politics.  
 
Almost half (47.9%) of the named claims-making organisations had ‘Muslim/Islamic’ 
identities. This not only underlines the importance of Muslim identity as a basis for Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi mobilisation, but also shows that there is a high level of autonomous 
organisation within these communities for making political demands. It is worth noting, that 
no organisations made claims as ‘Asians’, the state’s preferred label for such minorities, 
although the Black and Asian Police Officers’ Association provides a single example of the 
use of an official ‘racial’ label, not surprisingly for an organisation within a state institution. 
These findings make clear that Pakistani and Bangladeshi minorities are highly organised 
around types of identities which contradict the British state’s racial categorisation of them. 
Although this indicates a dissociative strategy in relation to British politics, a closer look at 
some of the organisations somewhat qualifies this statement. 
 
Two thirds of the named Muslim organisations identified themselves with British society or 
their locality in Britain, by their name and scope of operation- e.g., Muslim Youth Movement 
of Great Britain, Muslim UK Action Committee, Supreme Council of British Muslims’ 
Conference, Muslim Parliament, Islamic Party, Council of Mosques, Muslim Forum, Union 
of Muslim Organisations- and thus actually express strong acculturative dimensions. Of the 
other Muslim organisations, a ninth had dissociative religious self-identification strategies –
e.g. the Islamic Society for Religious Tolerance- whereas the remaining two ninths  were 
fundamentalist Islamic organisations –e.g., the People’s Mojahedin, al-Muhajiroun- with 
marginal strategies in relation to British politics. 
 
These findings make clear that a considerable proportion of Muslim claims-making is 
acculturative and made within the British political context. Other studies have also pointed 
out that Muslims are as likely to see themselves as British as all the other minorities in 
Britain. Of the minority groups questioned about identity by Modood et al (1997: 329), 66% 
and 60% of the two predominantly Muslim groups, Pakistanis and Bangladeshi, answered in 
the affirmative when asked if they thought of themselves as ‘British’. This compares with the 
similar figure of 64% for Caribbeans, and 62% for Indians, who are of course predominantly 
non-Muslim.17 Thus the high levels of British ‘Muslim’ mobilisation cannot simply be 
explained by the ‘primordialist’ argument which has some popular saliency, that there is a 
world-wide rise of militant Islam. On the contrary, the high mobilisation of British Muslims is 
an outcome of the paradoxical set of political opportunities which they face within British 
Race Relations politics.  
 
After the Rushdie Affair, when the British state took the clear position that blasphemy law did 
not extend to the Muslim religion, Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities have used their 
autonomous organisational structures for mobilising contentious demands for an extension of 
cultural pluralism to include the principle of religious equality for Islam. In addition, the 
groups are sufficiently well organised at the community level to make themselves visible as 
an autonomous actor in the public domain, despite the fact that making demands for religious 
rather than racial equality provokes strong reactions from sections of the majority society and 
the state itself. However, the total absence of political claims-making by Hindus –another 
religious minority, who unlike Sikhs and Jews are not recognised as ‘ethnic’ minorities in 
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 It should be also noted that this research found that minorities did not think of identities in a mutually 
exclusive zero-sum way, and that in most cases they saw themselves as being both ‘British’ and belonging to a 
‘ethnic’ group. This indicates that minorities may select the identities which they use to enter the public and 
political domain strategically, which is, of course, the premise of the approach defended here.  
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British law- suggests that we are not simply dealing with a conflict over religious equality in 
Britain. Survey research has shown that the mean weekly earnings of male Hindus (£338) are 
much higher than for Muslims (£223), and that Muslims were significantly more likely to live 
in households with low incomes (Modood et al. 1997:113; 163). In line with the arguments 
made earlier, it appears that there also is a strong socio-economic basis to the mobilisation of 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis as Muslims, and that Muslim identity is increasingly a form for 
expressing political demands within Britain. In a sense, the Muslim identity has replaced the 
Asian categorisation, and become a basis for collective mobilisation against discrimination in 
society. The demands for an extension of the Race Relations framework to a cultural 
pluralism which recognises Muslims as a minority, has a socio-economic basis, and gives a 
collective identity for the Indian Subcontinent minority ‘underclass’. 
 
Regarding the named organisations with ‘Black’ identities (29.1%), The Society of Black 
Lawyers and the National Black Caucus alone accounted for two thirds, whereas other 
examples include the Consortium of Black Organisations, the London Collective of Black 
Governors. What is interesting here, is that more than three quarters of these organisations 
were ‘middle-class’ type of organisations, such as the lawyers and governors. In contrast, 
there where very few autonomous grass roots community organisations, with two examples 
being the Black Panthers UK and the Black Female Prisoners Scheme. This shows that one of 
the effects of the strong assimilative basis of African-Caribbean mobilisation, has in fact been 
to militate against autonomous community-level activism. According to this interpretation, 
the British system of Race Relations provides limited opportunities for access to the political 
system - channelled along the racial category ‘black’ - that are taken up by the middle class 
organisations, whereas the remainder of the African-Caribbean minorities are structured into a 
position of disadvantage and marginalisation, lacking the resources to mobilise on the basis of 
an autonomous collective identity and challenge the British state.18 
 
We confronted members of the African-Caribbean community with this hypothetical 
explanation in focus groups, and they were highly critical of the élites within their own 
community, and the ‘representative’ function which they perform. The argument was made 
repeatedly that the leaders within the African-Caribbean community who take on 
representative roles within politics and local government become detached from the concerns 
and grievances of the community, and seek individual careerist gains. Whereas they saw their 
community as divided, and themselves as a marginalised group, they expressed admiration for 
the level of cohesion and organisation among Asian minorities, which in some cases reminded 
them of community support networks in the Caribbean. 
 
The main point to draw from this is that the differential opportunities for inclusion within 
British politics that has been produced by racial categorisation, does not simply translate into 
beneficial ‘outcomes’ for African-Caribbean minorities and detrimental ‘outcomes’ for 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. On the contrary, the peculiar hybrid of assimilationism and 
limited pluralism defined by ‘racial equality’ that has dominated the integrationist thinking of 
British élites since the early sixties, seems to have produced unintended consequences, and 
negative feedbacks in structuring the potential of both communities to engage in political 
action. 
 
Minority Action Repertoires in Claims-making 
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 Other authors make a similar point, namely that when a state enforces cultural pluralism, it can also structure 
disadvantage for the target minorities. Multicultural policies may have detrimental effects, on the Dutch case see 
WRR report 1990. 
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Another important indicator for the relationship of minorities to national politics is the type of 
actions which they use for making themselves and their contentious demands visible in the 
public domain. Table 5 gives the action repertoires used by minority groups. In addition to the 
overall distribution of action-forms used by minority groups, we also present those of 
different groups, which are defined by their collective identities. Regarding the four action-
forms: ‘conventional’ are those such as public statements and press conferences; 
‘demonstrative’ are symbolic non-confrontational protests, such as peaceful demonstrations, 
and vigils; ‘confrontational’ protests include strikes, hunger strikes, and boycotts; and finally, 
‘violent’ protests are illegal acts, causing damage to people or property.    
 
-table five about here- 
 
A first general finding is that those groups directly recognised by British ethnic relations 
politics have more institutionalised and conventional action repertoires, than those with 
limited channels of access to institutional power and recognition. Thus ninety per cent of the 
claims-making of the status group ‘Ethnic minorities’ and the racial status group ‘Black’ took 
conventional forms such as public statements. The same incidentally holds for the ‘ethnically’ 
recognised religious group, ‘Jews’, where 12 out of 13 cases were conventional. In contrast, 
the group lacking basic rights of residence and nationality, asylum-seekers, needed to use 
many confrontational protests (44%) to make their demands visible in the public domain.  
 
When we compare the action-forms used by ‘Black’ (African-Caribbean) and ‘All Indian 
Subcontinent’ minorities (columns two and three), we find that a greater proportion of Indian 
Subcontinent claims-making are symbolic, confrontational and violent protests (‘Black’ 
12.8%; ‘All Indian Subcontinent’ 32.7%), whereas a greater proportion of African-Caribbean 
is conventional (‘Black’ 87.2%; ‘All Indian Subcontinent’ 67.3%). This underlines our 
findings that British Race Relations produces more assimilative strategies among African-
Caribbean than Indian Subcontinent minorities.     
 
To examine Indian Subcontinent mobilisation more closely, we also differentiate three sub-
categories ‘Indian subcontinent national and ethnic’, ‘Muslim’ and ‘Asian’. The contrast 
between ‘Asian’ and ‘Muslim’ groups is striking. Although ‘Asian’ is the officially 
recognised racial status category, which leads one to expect relatively easy access to the 
political field, less than half of ‘Asian’ claims-making took conventional forms (46.2%) and 
more than a third (38.5%) were actually violent and illegal actions. In contrast, almost three-
quarters of ‘Muslim’ claims-making was conventional (72.3%), despite the non-recognition of 
Islam by British Race Relations policies. Indeed the action repertoire of ‘Muslim’ claims-
making has a similar distribution to that of all minority groups, and included less violent 
actions than mobilisation by ‘national/ethnic’ or ‘Asian’ groups. This evidence quashes the 
popular myth of Islam being a militant threat to law and order in British society, and suggests 
that the high level of autonomous organisation by Muslims, actually produces less violence.  
 
The relatively high number of ‘Asian’ violent actions were mostly committed by gangs of 
‘Asian’ youths, including examples such as a racial attack on white schoolboy, inner urban 
unrest and rioting, as well as a violent anti-racist mobilisation against a police station where 
the white perpetrator of a racist attack was held in custody. This high level of violence by 
‘Asian youths’, is indicative of the alienated inner-urban few, who are the most socio-
economically disadvantaged –Pakistani and Bangladeshi youths suffer from the highest levels 
of unemployment, and lowest educational achievements19- and who fall through safety net of 
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 Youth unemployment for Bangladeshis and Pakistanis under 35 years old is 37% and higher than for other 
groups: Caribbean 34%; Indian/African Asian 20%; White 15% (Modood et al 1997: 91). Other survey research, 
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autonomous provision by the community. Such findings support the thesis that ‘Asian’ youths 
as doubly disadvantaged and marginalised, by falling between ‘two cultures’ Britain and the 
Homeland, neither of which fit or provide adequately for their aspirations. 
 
Institutional and Civil Society Addressees of Minority Claims-making  
 
Table 6 turns attention to the institutions and civil society organisations which are addressed 
by minority claims-making. Regarding all minority demands, just less than a third (29.8%) 
were made on the police and security agencies. This high proportion of demands directed 
principally against the police relate to real or perceived discrimination in the carrying out of 
law enforcement, and charges of racist violence and abuse by police officers. Clearly, this is a 
prominent concern among minorities, a finding which is backed up by British Crime Survey 
Data, where 69% of Afro-Caribbeans, 45% Indians and 47% Pakistanis thought that the police 
did not treat everyone fairly (Fitzgerald 1998:174). That it appears as a particular concern for 
African-Caribbean minorities is supported by our findings (43.1% demands targeting police; 
19.0% judicial system), our own focus group research, and by studies on the criminal justice 
system. In a state which upholds the principle of racial equality and anti-discrimination, racial 
minorities are able to target a large number of demands against institutions which they 
perceive as failing to live up to these standards.  
 
-table 6 about here- 
 
Moving on to compare the claims-making by different groups, we find the most striking 
differences in the addressees of ‘Black’ (African-Caribbean) minorities and ‘Muslims’. An 
important difference is the proportion of claims where there was an identifiable addressee, 
which was much higher for ‘Black’ (82.9%) than for ‘Muslim’ (30.8%) groups. Once more, 
this finding confirms that British Race Relations policies provide greater opportunities for 
groups defined on a racial basis to make demands on state and civil society actors, than it does 
for those which identify on a religious basis. Our data shows that it is relatively harder for 
Muslim than African-Caribbean minorities to make their demands resonate by targeting actors 
within the institutional framework of British politics. In contrast, a group which is constructed 
from Indian Subcontinent minorities excluding Indians, Sikhs and Hindus (column three) 
appears as an intermediate case, which shows that Muslim groups using non-religious 
identities, are in a better position to make demands on British institutions. 
 
A last general finding is that contrary to the expectations of ‘postnational citizenship’ theories 
(Soysal 1994, 1997), which emphasise the importance of the transnational level, and 
especially international human rights institutions and conventions, for minority claims-
making, we find little evidence that minorities target supranational (less than 2%) as opposed 
to national institutions. If this is an emergent trend then we find little empirical evidence to 
support it.20 
 
Political Demands in Minority Claims-making 
 
Lastly, we focus on the types of political demands which are made by minorities, which are 
central to understanding the political conflicts over relationships between the state and 
resident minorities, and between the majority and minority publics. Table 7 shows the 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Labour Force Survey, found that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the age group 16-24 years were the least well 
qualified, whereas African Asians and Indians were better qualified than Whites (Jones 1993:36).  
20
 There is insufficient space to present anything other than a caricature of this argument here, for a more detailed 
exposition, see Koopmans and Statham 1998. 
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distribution of minority demands across six sub-fields of migration and ethnic relations 
politics: integration and anti-discrimination, cultural diversity and group politics, anti-racist 
and xenophobic, immigration and asylum,  ethnic conflict, and homeland politics. 
 
Reminiscent of the Roy Jenkins’ famous formula for the British integration of minorities, 
‘equal opportunity and cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’, 
integration/anti-discrimination and cultural diversity/group politics are the issue fields 
represented by the first two parts of this equation. Integration and anti-discrimination politics 
covers the state actions and policy measures for integrating minorities, whereas cultural 
diversity and group politics is the field concerning pluralism and the cultural diversity of 
minorities. Anti-racist and xenophobic politics is the third pillar of the Jenkins formula, 
namely issues concerning the relationships between the majority and minority populations in 
the public domain. Our discussion here will focus on these three issue fields.21 
 
 -table 7 about here-  
 
A general point to draw attention to here, concerns the different levels of support or 
opposition from other actors which confront minorities in their claims-making. The second 
column gives the valences of all non-minority actors –ranging from –1 anti-minority/racist to 
1 pro-minority/anti-racist- distributed by issue-field. These figures show that there is a much 
more supportive set of discursive alliances available for minority claims in the integration 
field (0.55) than in the cultural diversity field (0). However, minorities themselves made more 
claims in the cultural diversity/group (27.5%) where they were responsible for half of the 
demands (50.0%), than in the integration field (21.6%) where they accounted for only an 
eighth (11.8%). Taken together, these findings show that although cultural diversity is an 
issue field which is shaped and promoted to an important extent by minorities, they face much 
more hostile opposition from state and civil society actors for this type of demand. 
Conversely, majority actors give more favourable support to minority claims for integration 
within the Race Relations framework, than to demands for a more radical version of cultural 
pluralism. On the surface, this lends some support to the arguments within contemporary 
debates on multiculturalism that minorities are increasingly making demands for special 
cultural group rights, and that this has provoked hostile reactions from the majority society 
(e.g., Young 1998). More specifically, it gives empirical evidence which supports those 
authors who argue that opposition to minorities in Britain (and elsewhere) is increasingly 
expressed as opposition to cultural difference –‘cultural racism’- than racial difference (see 
especially Modood 1997b). We can add more detail to such hypotheses, however, by 
distinguishing between different types of minorities, and looking at specific demands. 
 
Following the same pattern we have identified in relation to other variables, there are once 
more striking differences between the claims-making of ‘Black’ and ‘Muslim’ groups. 
Whereas half of ‘Black’ (African-Caribbean) minority claims (51.4%) related to 
integration/anti-discrimination and an additional third (37.2%) to anti-racist/xenophobic 
politics, these two fields together were the subject of only a tenth (10.6%) of demands by 
‘Muslim’ groups. Conversely, more than two thirds of ‘Muslim’ demands (67.7%) related to 
cultural diversity/group politics, compared to only a twelfth (7.1%) by ‘Black’ minorities. At 
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 Immigration and asylum covers issues of border controls and aliens in Britain, whereas homeland politics 
refers to issues defined outside of British politics referring to conflicts in the country of origin, for example 
between Pakistanis and Indians. Ethnic conflict refers to conflicts between different minority groups that occur 
in the British national context, and cannot be traced to homeland politics, one example being inter-ethnic 
violence between Black-African and Islamic students at a London College. 
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the risk of repetition, these marked differences in the claims by African-Caribbean and 
Muslim groups are best explained by the differential opportunities facing them.  
 
‘Black’ African-Caribbeans are defined as a racial minority by British politics, and see 
themselves as such, making anti-discrimination demands relating to the state treatment of 
minorities, and anti-racist demands relating to unfair treatment in civil society. When seen as 
a set of political opportunities, the official language and system of British Race Relations 
channels the demands of this group into focusing on their perceived or real unequal treatment 
by the state and majority society. What we witness here, is strong evidence that for African-
Caribbean minorities, anti-discrimination demands and claims for justice have been racialised 
into and language and identity for ‘black’ politics. That ‘black’ politics has become the way 
of expressing grievances and injustice claims is demonstrated by the actual language of 
political demands made in our sample. Demands for extending social and political rights are 
‘racialised’. 
 
For example, the demand by a group for ‘black’ representation on juries to redress the unjust 
effects of prejudice:  
 
‘The vast majority of black defendants face juries who are often ignorant bigoted and 
blatantly hostile to the defendant before a trial even begins.’  
 
In another typical example, the group challenge the unjust effects of inequality in the 
judiciary:  
 
‘Blacks are over-policed and fed into a criminal justice system, where they are less likely to 
get bail, more likely to be acquitted but, if convicted, likely to get longer sentences than 
whites’.  
 
The vast majority of demands by African-Caribbean groups are made in these racial 
assimilative terms. They are framed within the concept of injustice that is upheld by the 
principle of racial equality. However, such demands are not necessarily ‘assimilative’ in the 
sense of being a passive mirror image of Race Relations politics, on the contrary, they often 
radicalise the concept of racial equality from its watered-down official meaning to the basis of 
a collective identity of rights for ‘black’ minorities – i.e. ‘black politics’. In a sense they are 
more acculturative in their assertion for new rights of pluralism. This finding of a strong 
racialised political identity in African-Caribbean mobilisation against perceived injustices, 
supports several descriptive accounts which emphasise the dominance of ‘blackness’ within 
anti-racist politics in Britain (Modood 1997b, Shukra 1998).  
 
Before turning to ‘Muslim’ claims, we first look at ‘Other Indian subcontinent’ minorities, 
which has been constructed from ‘Asian’ and Indian Subcontinent ‘national and ethnic 
groups’: Bangladeshi, Pakistani, and Bengali. This group explicitly excludes the ‘integrated’ 
Indian and Sikh minorities22, and so basically consists of Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Asian 
mobilisation that does not carry the religious identification of Muslim. In contrast to ‘Muslim’ 
groups, four fifths (80.9%) of the claims by ‘Other Indian Subcontinent’ groups were in the 
integration/anti-discrimination and anti-racist/xenophobic fields, and only an eighth (11.9%) 
referred to cultural diversity/group politics. This indicates that Indian subcontinent groups 
which do not publicly identify themselves as Muslim, are in an intermediary position between 
‘Black’ and ‘Muslim’ groups, although a large proportion of them are actually Muslims. 
When religious inequality is not the issue, Indian subcontinent minorities have similar 
                                                           
22
 Though it may be that some actual Indian or Sikh mobilisation is included in ‘Asian’.  
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demands relating to integration and anti-racism as other minorities. Indeed that just more than 
half (54.7%) of the claims by the ‘Other Indian Subcontinent’ group were in the anti-
racism/xenophobic field, indicates that this section of society is highly active in demanding 
more measures against racial abuse and violence. This is hardly surprising when the British 
Crime Survey data from 1992 pointed out that 56% of South Asians perceived assaults against 
them as racially motivated compared to only 24% of Afro-Caribbeans (Skellington 1996:89). 
The engagement of Pakistani and Bangladeshi minorities in integration and anti-racist politics 
with racial and ‘colonial’ national and ethnic identities, also gives support for the argument 
made by other authors (see e.g., Werbner 1991) that minorities make a strategic use of self-
identification when entering the British political domain. 
 
Our findings highlight an important point: that in Britain the field of demands relating to 
cultural diversity, is predominantly concerned with a single-issue, the position of Islam within 
British society. A few examples of demands for special group rights were found by minority 
groups which did not define themselves as ‘Muslim’, including ‘Black’, ‘Other Indian 
Subcontinent’, and even one ‘Indian’ case. However, accounting for only 15.8% of all 
minority demands, this hardly seems to constitute the general societal change that is 
envisaged by references –usually on the basis of a few supposedly representative examples- to 
the increasing number of demands for cultural group rights, in current literature on 
multiculturalism (e.g. Young 1998). In the British case, our findings point toward a more 
localised contextual explanation. 
 
Having pointed out that our findings strongly support the emphasis that several authors –
principally Modood on ‘Muslimophobia’ (1997a; 1997b)- have placed on the importance of 
the Muslim/Non-Muslim distinction as a conflict line between minorities and majority within 
British society, we turn attention now to the nature of Muslim group claims.  
 
About four-tenths of all Muslim claims were for special group rights, and the recognition of 
cultural differences. About half of these demands were for special provision of religious 
instruction in schools, with most cases being demands for pluralism within the existing 
framework of state schooling, though there were also a few cases of demands for separate 
Islamic schools. Many claims demanded an extension of the state privileges afforded to 
Roman Catholic and Jewish schools. For example, a Muslim accused Trafford Council of 
‘discrimination’ for paying fees for Roman Catholics to attend an independent Catholic 
school but not for his daughter to attend an independent Islamic school: 
 
‘Muslims (have) the right to withhold that part of their taxes used to finance denominational 
schools for Jews and Catholics’.  
 
Looking at the language of such claims, it soon becomes clear that the vast majority frame the 
perceived injustice at religious inequality within a language of ‘discrimination’. It appears that 
Muslims are not expressing their cultural difference per se, but that they are making demands 
for social and political rights on the basis of their actual shared collective identity. Muslim 
demands for religious equality, are made in acculturative rather than dissociative terms, 
precisely because they constitute the demands for equal social and political rights by a 
collective group who cannot define themselves within the available racialised conceptual 
framework for redressing discrimination.  
 
Even a British ‘headscarf case’, a paradigmatic example in multiculturalism literature, has 
acculturative rather than dissociative tones, where the demand for justice is for  equal 
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treatment in education, and not a pro-active expression of the intrinsic value of cultural 
difference:  
 
‘There was nothing in the school rules about scarves when we went there. The rules were 
amended last year to specifically exclude headscarves... We are not fanatics or 
fundamentalists. We just want the right to continue our education.’  
 
The Race Relations framework offers an unfavourable language of access to redress of 
grievance for Muslims against their perceived and actual grievances. In contrast to the official 
‘Asian’ category, the Muslim identity brings together the groups sharing the most 
discriminated and underprivileged status, and is a more natural basis for self-identification. 
However, their demands which for the most part are for social and political equality, become 
perceived as a cultural threat by the majority society, because they are a group with a religious 
identity. Our findings therefore point toward an interpretation whereby the majority of 
Muslim mobilisation should be seen as that of a status group23 demanding straightforward 
social and political rights, whereas only a small minority is indicative of highly dissociative 
expressions of religious difference.   
 
Conclusions: Cracks in the British Race Relations Pot? 
 
On entering mainland Europe, the British approach for integrating minorities presents itself as 
a ‘success story’. Both leading politicians and élite minority activists from bodies like the 
Commission for Racial Equality, see fit to lecture the ‘Europeans’ on the virtues of British 
Race Relations. This affection for the quirky and idiosyncratic system of Race Relations is 
often justified on the basis that ‘it works’, and ‘if it works for Britain, then why could it not 
also work for Europe?’ Such a logic was behind the retreat of British minorities from the 
European Migrants’ Forum and the setting up of an alternative, the Standing Conference on 
Racial Equality for Europe (SCORE) (Favell 1998). Even when they get off the Eurostar in 
Brussels, British minority activists support only ‘one nation cultural pluralism’, and that one 
nation is Britain. Judged by internationalist aspirations, SCORE was undoubtedly an own goal 
for minorities, but what it really demonstrates, is a point which is the lynch-pin of the political 
opportunity approach defended here: British minority activism is very much a product of 
British Race Relations politics. It is therefore pertinent to focus on the national context, and 
ask to what extent the lines of political conflict that are produced by minority mobilisation can 
be seen as an affirmation or contradiction of a system for incorporation founded on the 
principle of ‘racial equality’. 
 
A first general point from the analysis is rather self-evident, namely that minorities with full 
formal citizenship rights face fewer barriers of access to the political system, and have a more 
favourable set of discursive alliances in the political field, than those without, such as asylum-
seekers. Among the political parties, the Labour Party came out clearly as an ally for both 
resident minorities and refugees/asylum-seekers, whereas the Conservative Party took up an 
especially anti-asylum-seeker position. This shows that the Labour party fulfils a special role 
in representing minority interests, however, the degree of co-optation is not sufficient to make 
autonomous minority mobilisation unnecessary. On the contrary, according to our data 
resident minorities have sufficient resources to make themselves the most ‘visible’ actor in the 
contentious field of ethnic relations politics. 
 
Regarding resident minorities, the most important findings are drawn from a comparison of 
identities, action-forms, addressees and demands that were used in the mobilisation by 
                                                           
23
 Modood (1997b) has even argued that Muslims in Britain have the characteristics of a class.  
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African-Caribbean and Indian subcontinent groups. Our basic finding is that the differences in 
the claims-making strategies of minority groups are best explained by the political 
opportunities which confront them. This requires that we interpret the patterns of conflict 
signalled by minority mobilisation as outcomes, unintended consequences, and negative 
feedbacks, from the peculiar hybrid of assimilationism and limited racialised pluralism, that 
has been the hallmark of British integrationist thinking since the 1960s. Our findings clearly 
show that these élite perceptions have had a lasting impact by shaping the channels of access 
available to minorities for participation in the political community. Minority claims-making 
and the patterns of conflict between the minority and majority populations still bear the 
imprint of such consequences in the 1990s.  
 
The brand of cultural pluralism  sponsored by British Race Relations –on the principle of 
racial equality- has structured an inequality of opportunities facing the two main groups. 
African-Caribbeans mobilise as ‘Black’ along racial lines, use a strongly assimilative identity 
and conventional action forms, and target the state institutions with demands for justice which 
are framed within the recognised framework for redressing for racial discrimination. In 
general, this claims-making can be seen as a direct response to the institutional and racialised 
discursive channels of access which extend from the political system to minorities. However, 
an important caveat should be inserted here. Most of the ‘Black’ organisations which had the 
resources to make their autonomous demands ‘visible’ in the political domain, were in fact 
representative of ‘middle class’ minority interests, such as lawyers and politicians. The 
relative absence of grass-roots and community type ‘Black’ organisations, suggests that the 
incorporation of upwardly mobile African-Caribbeans, may be to the disadvantage of the 
majority of African-Caribbeans. In other words, there may be important socio-economic 
‘class’ inequalities within African-Caribbean communities, whose political voice is lost 
through the co-optation of potential leaders. Such a process is encouraged by British 
integration policies that provide rights for redress to racial discrimination -through courts, 
industrial tribunals- for individuals rather groups. 
 
In contrast, Indian Subcontinent minorities mobilised along lines of race, religion and national 
and ethnic origin as: ‘Asian’, ‘Muslim’, ‘Sikh’, ‘Bangladeshi’, ‘Pakistani’, ‘Indian’, and 
‘Bengali’. This in itself indicates that political opportunities which are extended along racial 
lines do not encompass sufficient scope for incorporating minorities from the Indian 
Subcontinent as a single collective group. Indeed the official category of ‘Asian’ was not used 
by any of the recorded Indian Subcontinent organisations.  
 
The most visible collective mobilisation of Indian Subcontinent minorities was by ‘Muslim’ 
groups. These are highly autonomously organised, use predominantly conventional action 
forms, mobilise with a religious identification, and although they have difficulty in targeting 
their demands toward state institutions, they primarily make public demands for extending the 
principle of racial discrimination to their non-racial collective group. As striking as the 
visibility of ‘Muslim’, ‘Pakistani’ and ‘Bangladeshi’ groups was the absence of their ‘Indian’, 
‘Hindu’ and ‘Sikh’ counterparts. This finding strongly supports the position that has been put 
forward by Tariq Modood for several years, that the divisions within Indian Subcontinent 
minorities are at least as great as those between them and other minority and majority groups. 
More specifically, the division among Indian Subcontinent minorities has a socio-economic 
and ‘class’ basis, whereby Indian, Hindu, and Sikh minorities are better integrated within 
British society, and so have less incentive to mobilise for an extension of social and political 
rights.  
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Conversely, the ‘Muslim’ groups are Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, which according to social 
indicators are in a highly disadvantaged position in British society, and which are in material 
need of better social and political rights. This indicates that in the British case, there is a 
strong socio-economic basis for shared experiences and grievances for the collective group 
whose self-identification is a religious distinction, Muslims. In a sense, there is a strong 
‘class’ and to a certain extent ‘underclass’ dimension to Muslim identity, and this goes a long 
way to explaining one of our central findings, namely, that contrary to the popular 
‘Islamophobic’ beliefs among the ethnic majority in Britain, the strategies of Muslim, 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi minorities have a strong acculturative rather than a dissociative 
dimension in their relation to British society. Many organisations identified themselves as 
British Muslims, and perhaps most significantly, the majority of demands that were made for 
special group rights and recognition were framed within a anti-discrimination framework of 
social and political equality, and were not expressions of the right to cultural difference per 
se. 
 
Disappointing as this may be for those multicultural theorists who tend to see demands for 
particularist group rights as the essence of minority claims-making (e.g., Young 1998), the 
position of Muslims in Britain is better explained by the national political context. Rather than 
taking the transnational character of Islamic identification at face value, the conditions of the 
national setting explain more precisely the form which political mobilisation by these groups 
takes in the society of settlement. Facing cultural exclusion from the set of racialised rights 
available to minorities, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have used religious organisations as the 
infrastructure for pushing for greater access to the material resources of political and social 
rights. Indeed, it is quite plausible that if the British framework for combating racial 
discrimination recognised the Islamic faith as a legitimate basis for ‘ethnic’ minority demands 
-in the same way as it does already for Sikhs and Jews, unconcerned by conceptual purity or 
clarity- then there may still be some mileage in the Race Relations formula. Academics 
seldom favour such pragmatic solutions, and would most likely prefer to do away altogether 
with the straightjacket of a racialised cultural pluralism, in favour of a more multicultural 
solution. However, as such decisions will be taken by the political establishment, who are 
always fearful of a majority backlash, perhaps British pragmatism is the most that British 
minorities can hope for. 
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Table 1: Claims-making Actors in the Migration and Ethnic Relations Fields 
1990-1996 
 Immigration 
and Asylum 
Minority 
Politics 
Anti-racism vs. 
Xenophobic 
Total 
Field* 
Supranational institutions (EU, UN) 
and foreign governments 2.7% 0.4% 0.9% 1.5% 
National/local government 29.0% 10.4% 2.6% 15.4% 
National/local legislative & political 
parties 20.6% 8.5% 23.0% 16.7% 
Judiciary 9.5% 6.1% 4.3% 6.8% 
Police/security agencies & state 
institutions 3.3% 10.7% 7.7% 7.0% 
State institutions dealing with 
minorities (e.g. CRE) 1.9% 6.3% 3.7% 3.9% 
Total state and party actors 67.0% 42.4% 42.2% 51.3% 
Human rights, welfare, pro-minority 
organisations 15.5% 4.9% 2.8% 8.3% 
Other civil society groups & 
organisations 7.3% 19.1% 12.1% 12.7% 
Anti-racist groups & organisations 0.6% 1.1% 9.9% 3.1% 
Minority/migrant groups & 
organisations 9.1% 29.8% 16.8% 19.4% 
Racist/extreme right groups & 
organisations 0.0% 0.2% 11.2% 2.9% 
Unknown  0.5% 2.5% 5.0% 2.3% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
N= 483 446 322 1269 
     
% of total field 38.1% 35.1% 25.4% 100.0% 
Valence: 0.32 0.51 0.41 0.41 
 
*   includes additional 18 cases relating to ‘Homeland Politics’ 
** includes trade unions, employers, churches, media, cultural organisations etc. 
Valence score:  
-1 = anti-minority/racist; 1 = pro-minority/anti-racist; 0 = neither pro- nor anti-minority/racist 
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Table 2: Political Party Claims in Migration and Ethnic Relations Field 
1990-96 
 
Proportion of Political 
Party Claims (%) 
Immigration & 
Asylum valence 
Minority & Antiracism/ 
Xenophobia valence 
Overall Field 
valence 
Labour 29.8% 0.80 0.65 0.72 
Liberal Democrats 7.3% 0.71 0.00 0.18 
Conservative 59.0% -0.50 0.03 -0.35 
British National Party/ 
National Front 3.9% - -0.73 -0.73 
     
Total 100.0% -0.16 0.20 -0.005 
N= 383 218 165 383 
Party Claims/ Percentage 
of all Claims (%) 30.2% 45.1% 21.5%  
 
Valence scores: 
-1 = anti-minority/racist; 1 = pro-minority/anti-racist; 0 = neither pro- nor anti-minority/racist 
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Table 3: Minorities in Britain According to 1991 Census 
Minority Categories Population percent of total British population 
Black  1.6% 
Black Caribbean 500,000 0.9% 
Black African 212,000 0.4% 
Black Other 178,000 0.3% 
South Asian  2.7% 
Indian 840,000 1.5% 
Pakistani 477,000 0.9% 
Bangladeshi 163,000 0.3% 
Chinese and Others  1.2% 
Chinese 157,000 0.3% 
Other Asian 198,000 0.4% 
Other Other 290,000 0.5% 
 
sources: Owen 1992:2 cited Mason 1995:35; Modood et al 1997:13.  
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Table 4: Collective Identities of Actors in Claims-Making by Minority Groups  
in Britain, 1990-1996 
  Minority Groups (%)  Named Minority Organisations (%) 
Status Groups 15.0 6.3 
Asylum-seekers 5.9 - 
Immigrants/Foreigners 0.7 - 
Ethnic Minorities 8.4 6.3 
Racial Groups 36.7 29.1 
Black 25.3 28.1 
Black and Asian 0.4 1.0 
Asian 9.2 - 
Afro-Caribbean  1.1 - 
Black African 0.7 - 
Religious Groups 24.5 47.9 
Muslim/Islamic 23.8 47.9 
Rastafarian 0.7 - 
National and Ethnic Groups 23.1 16.6 
Jewish 4.8 8.3 
Gypsy/Roma 0.7 2.1 
Sikh 1.1 - 
Bangladeshi 3.7 2.1 
Pakistani 1.9 2.1 
Indian 1.1 1.0 
Bengali 0.7 - 
Nigerian 0.4 - 
Zairean 0.7 - 
Algerian 0.7 - 
Egyptian 0.4 - 
Iranian 0.7 - 
Iraqi 0.4 - 
Turkish 0.4 - 
Kurdish 1.5 - 
Bosnian 0.7 - 
Romanian 1.1 - 
Chinese/HK Chinese 0.7 - 
Sub-national UK – Irish/Welsh 0.7 1.0 
European EU 0.7 - 
Other 0.7 0.0 
Total 100.0% 99.9%** 
N= 273* 96 
 
*   first or second named actor 
** less than 100% due to rounding 
 30
 
Table 5: Forms of claims-making by minority groups  
1990-96 (%) 
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Conventional 
actions  91.3 87.2 67.3 77.3 72.3 46.2 55.6 75.8 
Demonstrative 
protests 0.0 7.1 10.6 13.6 9.2 11.5 0.0 6.2 
Confrontational 
protests 0.0 1.4 7.9 0.0 12.3 3.8 44.4 9.2 
Violent  
acts 8.7 4.3 14.2 9.1 6.2 38.5 0.0 8.8 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
N= 23 70 113 22 65 26 27 273 
 
*  includes all asylum-seekers, even cases where a national or ethnic label was also given 
 
+ category includes national or ethnic groups from Indian subcontinent: ‘Bangladeshis’,  
  ‘Pakistanis’, ‘Bengalis’, ‘Indians’ and ‘Sikhs’ 
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Table 6: ‘Addressees’: Actors addressed by minority claims, 
1990-1996 
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Supranational institutions (EU, Allied Coalition) - 15.0 - 1.8 
Foreign governments - - 4.5 2.9 
National/local government 6.9 25.0 18.2 22.2 
National/local legislative and political parties - - 13.6 4.7 
Judiciary 19.0 5.0 - 9.9 
Police and security agencies 43.1 5.0 40.9 29.8 
State institutions 5.2 20.0 4.5 6.4 
State institutions for minorities/migrants (e.g. CRE) - 15.0 - 3.5 
Total state and party actors 74.2 85.0 81.7 81.2 
Unions and professional organisations 3.4 5.0 4.5 6.4 
Employers and business organisations  1.7 5.0 9.1 5.3 
Other civil society organisations 20.7 5.0 4.5 7.1 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 99.8%** 100.0% 
N= 58 20 22 171 
% of total demands with addressee 82.9% 30.8% 52.4% 62.6% 
 
*   Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Bengali and Asian (i.e., All Indian Subcontinent with national, 
ethnic or racial identities minus six Indian and Sikh cases) 
** less than 100.0% due to rounding 
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Table 7: Distribution of Types of Political Demands in Migration and Ethnic Relations 
Fields, 1990-1996 
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Integration and Anti-
discrimination Politics 20.2 0.55 21.6 23.0 4.5 51.4 26.2 
Policy measures/implementation 10.2 0.67 7.6 16.3 - 15.7 14.3 
Labour market/employment 3.7 0.66 5.5 31.9 1.5 10.0 7.1 
Judicial system 1.9 0.93 3.7 41.7 1.5 10.0 2.4 
Police law enforcement 4.4 0.07 4.8 23.2 1.5 15.7 2.4 
Cultural Diversity and Group 
Politics 11.8 0.00 27.5 50.0 67.7 7.1 11.9 
State repression of specific groups 2.7 -0.04 3.3 26.5 4.6 1.4 0.0 
Cultural demands  
(religious equality, group rights) 6.4 0.08 15.8 52.4 47.7 4.3 4.8 
Group expression of cultural identity 2.7 -0.18 8.4 67.7 15.4 1.4 7.1 
Anti-racist and Xenophobic 
Politics 27.9 0.33 25.3 19.5 6.1 37.2 54.7 
Police racism (abuse and violence) 2.8 0.50 6.9 54.3 3.1 11.4 16.6 
Judiciary/Politicians’ racism (abuse) 3.6 0.38 3.3 19.6 - 7.2 4.8 
British societal racism/racist 
attitudes 11.8 0.59 9.2 16.7 1.5 11.4 19.0 
Racial attacks/violence (diffuse) 3.6 -0.26 4.4 26.1 1.5 7.2 11.9 
Extreme right/racist activism 
(organised)  6.1 0.12 1.5 5.1 - - 2.4 
Ethnic conflict (inter-ethnic and 
intra-ethnic – between minorities) 0.7 0 2.9 88.8 10.8 0.0 2.4 
‘Homeland’ Politics 1.3 0 5.1 82.4 10.8 0.0 2.4 
Immigration and Asylum Politics 38.1 0.21 17.6 9.9 0.0 4.3 2.4 
Total 100% 0.31 100% 21.5% 99.9% 100% 100% 
N 1269 996 273  65 70 42 
 
* Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Bengali and Asian (i.e., All Indian Subcontinent with national, 
ethnic or racial identities minus six Indian and Sikh cases) 
 
Valence score: 
-1 = anti-minority/racist; 1 = pro-minority/anti-racist; 0 = neither pro- nor anti-minority/racist 
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